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been some who have hitherto been disposed to question the policy of those restrictions which it has been thought needful to place upon the commercial operations of this country, with the view of withholding from the enemy, so far as we can, the means of conducting the war, and in order that our own far advanced arts should not be turned against our own troops, we think that the details which have appeared in the public journals during the past week must have removed all doubts as to the humanity and wisdom of the policy adopted. There may have been a certain degree of inconvenience, of sacrifice if you will, from the restrictions which have been imposed upon the export of gunpowder and fire-arms, saltpetre, boiler-plates, marine engines, boiler tubes, and other articles. The mercantile classes may have been exposed to some additional trouble in submitting to regulations imposed with a view of preventing legitimate trade to friendly States being made the vehicle of communicating with and supplying the enemy, by being called upon to conduct their trade under a strict system of bonds;—nay, the precautions which have been judged needful in order to prevent trading with the enemy, may, and in all probability have, deprived us of some legitimate trade with friendly States;—but admitting all this, is there an Englishman now, who, after the events of the last fortnight, will be found to question the wisdom and the justice of the course which has been pursued, even though the sacrifices had been infinitely greater than they have been? We will not speak of the additional taxes which the community have had to bear, or of the higher prices of some articles affected by the war, for the generosity and the justice of the English public have prevented the slightest complaints on those grounds; and we believe there is no sacrifice, within reasonable bounds, which they would not be prepared to make in order to assist our armies and our fleets in their arduous struggles. So far, therefore, from the present being a time when a relaxation of the rules imposed upon trade being justifiable, as has been urged in some quarters, the time has rather arrived when it has become needful to consider whether public feeling does not demand, and public interests do not fully justify and vindicate, a more strict observance of our rights as belligerents in matters of commerce, with a view of weakening the resources of the enemy.

Whatever course is taken, one thing is clear:—that it should be that which will aid to bring hostilities to an honourable and successful conclusion with all possible speed. This is the only test which should now guide the policy of England. Don't let us think of present cost, or present sacrifices, if they but tend to bring peace now and security hereafter. It is clear that these are only to be obtained by one means. The conflict to be short, must be sharp. But the public at home must be ready, as we feel sure they are, as well as the army abroad, to make the necessary sacrifices for the great object to be attained. The interests of humanity, social progress, and even of commerce itself, demand that the policy hitherto pursued shall be maintained and extended as new circumstances admit, with the same firm determination which has hitherto marked the whole arrangements and progress of the war.

PERENNIAL SOURCES OF RUSSIAN WEAKNESS.

A YEAR ago we ventured to hint that it might be worth while for Europe to go to war with Russia for the sake of information—in order to ascertain, that is, whether her strength was that of the bally or the giant—whether she was really entitled to dictate and domineer as she habitually did—whether, in a word, she was mighty in virtue of her own inherent force, or only in virtue of the ignorant timidity of her foes and rivals. We pointed out several notable sources of weakness in her institutions; we directed attention to the fact that nearly all her great acquisitions had been secured not by fighting but by bullying and intriguing; that diplomacy and not war had always been her favourite weapon; that she kept up such an enormous army on paper that all secondary States had arrived at the conclusion that resistance to her will was hopeless, but that in general she had carefully abstained from coming into actual armed collision with any first-rate Power. We expressed an opinion, too, that there was no reason whatever

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THE SACRIFICES OF WAR AGAINST THE CONVENIENCES OF TRADE.

The triumphs of war are purchased at a terrible price,—which nothing but a great, a just cause could justify. Hitherto the country has had only to consider the additional taxes to which it has been exposed, and the restrictions to which its commerce has been submitted—the one to furnish the direct cost of military operations, the other indirectly to co-operate with and assist our armies, by withholding supplies necessary for the enemy, or by crippling the internal resources of Russia. Now, the accounts from the Crimea, day by day, exhibit the cost in a far more fearful aspect. Our feelings are harrowed by the most graphic accounts of hundreds of our bravest countrymen struggling on the slopes of Alma, of the dying and the dead, and of thousands suffering from wounds and disease inflicted in their country's cause, stretched helpless in hospitals on a foreign shore. There is not a heart possessing a particle of high, just, and honourable feeling, which already has not felt how hard it is that a mere handful of our countrymen should alone be exposed to so much danger and hardship, for objects, the glory and advantage of which, when gained, are equally valuable and dear to every Englishman, though he may not have stirred a foot from his own comfortable home, or made a single sacrifice of any kind in order to secure them. There is not a man of ordinary feelings of humanity, who, while exulting in the triumphs of our arms, does not feel that he is personally called upon to make every sacrifice within his sphere in order to render this great and costly struggle as short and as decisive as possible; and the more he is animated with admiration of the courage and devotion of our troops, the more he feels it not only a duty but a high privilege to aid them by any means, however indirect they may be.

When we are compelled to take up arms and encounter a great struggle with a Power like that of Russia, every consideration of policy, humanity, and even of self-interest, point to the necessity of such complete measures being resorted to as shall render our efforts as complete, and the struggle as short, as possible. At the best war is a question of enormous sacrifices, but just in proportion as they are great in the first instance, in general their duration is short, and their entire amount curtailed. In the conduct of a war there is nothing so criminal as that apathy which postpones results, prolongs all its horrors and mischiefs, and suspends that progress which can alone be effectually made during a time of peace. If we look for that courage, energy, and self-devotion which distinguishes our armies, and for which we never look in vain, at least they have a right to expect that every possible means will be used at home which can strengthen them, or weaken the enemy. Therefore, there may have

to suppose that her armies were as effective now as in 1815, when they were supported by the subsidies of England and trained and disciplined by wars with France; and we ventured to surmise that when they came into actual conflict with competent forces and skilful commanders they would exhibit a degree of feebleness and failure that would cause general amazement.

Our suspicions have been more than realised. We know now that even in 1829, when the Russian troops came into collision with none but raw and half-trained Turkish recruits, who had abandoned their old costume and mode of fighting, and had not yet got accustomed to its substitute, they were so far from achieving a victory that they were only saved from utter annihilation by a treaty which the Ambassadors at Constantinople, in ignorance of the facts, persuaded the Sultan into signing, and which the Sultan, in equal ignorance, was terrified into believing necessary. Since then, the Circassian mountaineers have set at nought the whole forces of the Russian Empire for nearly a quarter of a century, and have destroyed army after army, at the rate, it is said, of 20,000 men per annum. No sooner did the present war with Turkey break out, than a host of similar facts, all pointing to the same conclusion, came to light. The Russians were the aggressors and ought to have been the best prepared: in fact for months we had heard of the vast armies which were pouring into the Principalities or converging from all parts of the Empire towards the seat of war. The Ottoman forces were supposed to be inferior in numbers, and no one had any confidence in their power of withstanding their Muscovite assailants. Yet in nearly every engagement, whether fighting behind their own entrenchments, as at Kalafat, or storming those of the enemy, as at Csitate—whether crossing the river to attack, as at Giurgevo, or preventing the passage, as at Rutschuk—they were signally and sanguinarily victorious; and at Silistria they sustained and repelled assaults behind mud walls as none but Spaniards have ever done before. Everywhere the Russians were defeated by inferior numbers. At Bomarsund they appear to have surrendered far more easily than was decorous, though ultimate surrender was no doubt inevitable. While at Alma, though they were in a position deemed impregnable, and though they seem for a while to have fought hard, yet in three hours they were driven from entrenchments which their commander expected them to be able to make good for three weeks. We must admit, certainly, that against the *élite* of the French and English armies fighting side by side, no fortifications and no troops could hold out long, or hope for final success; but still few anticipated so speedy or signal a defeat.

This unexpected weakness of Russia in military matters arises from four concurring causes, of which three are inherent in her system, and, if not absolutely incurable, are at least little likely to be cured.

In the *first* place, the nature of the country and the *want of roads*. Her resources may be vast, but they are scattered and remote. Her forces may be immense, but they are necessarily in great measure distant from the scene of action. The very extent of her territory is against her. Her capital is a thousand miles from her most menaced and unquiet provinces. It takes three months, sometimes six months, to convey her troops to the districts where their presence is required. There are no railroads, and scarcely any common roads to convey them. They have to march—and what is worse, to drag baggage, ammunition, and artillery—over inhospitable and uncultivated steppes, scantily inhabited and affording few resources for even peaceful travellers. In no country could railways be so cheaply or easily constructed; in no country are they so peculiarly and urgently needed;—yet only two, we believe, exist as yet, and few others are projected. Hence, when war is declared, a whole campaign will elapse before reinforcements can arrive at the place where they are needed. This will explain why the vast armies of Osten-Sacken and other Generals, which were announced as on their march to the Danube nearly a year ago, never reached that river at all; why of the 150,000 or 200,000 men who, we are told, occupied the Principalities, more than 70,000 never could be got together; and why we only find 50,000 troops in the Crimea, though nine months since it was proclaimed that *re-inforcements* to the number of 70,000 had been ordered thither. The fact is, that thousands die or fall sick on the road; thousands more lag behind or desert; and those who do reach their destination reach it in an enfeebled condition and after incalculable and often irretrievable delays.

Secondly. The Russian armies are often armies *on paper* only. Not only are their numbers far fewer than are stated in official returns and paid for out of the official purse, but they are notoriously ill-provided with everything necessary to the effective action of a soldier. The colonels of regiments and officers of the commissariat have a direct interest in having as large a number *on the books* and as small a number *in the field* as possible,—inasmuch as they pocket the pay and rations of the difference between these figures. They have an interest also in the men being so inadequately fed and clothed as possible,—inasmuch as they pocket the difference between the sum *allowed* and the sum *expended* on the soldiers' rations and accoutrements. The Emperor provides (or believes he does) for the food, clothing, lodging, arms and ammunition of 5 or 600,000 men; but every one of these who is or can be made non-existent is worth two or

three hundred roubles to some dishonest official or officer; every pair of shoes or great coat intercepted from the wretched soldier is a bottle of champagne for the ensign or the major; every ammunition waggon which is paid for by Government, but not provided, is a handsome addition to the salary of the captain or the contractor. Robbery and peculation of this sort is universal, in every rank, in every district, in every branch. It runs through every department in the Empire; and its operation upon the efficiency of the military service may be easily imagined and cannot be easily exaggerated.

This horrible and fatal system originates in two sources—both, we fear, nearly hopeless, and certainly inherent in Russian autocracy;—the rooted dishonesty of the national character, and the incurable inadequacy of despotic power. Cheating, bribery, peculation pervade the whole tribe of officials, and are, in fact, the key-note and characteristic of the entire administration. There seems to be no conscience, and not much concealment, about it. The officers are ill paid, and of course pay themselves. Regard for truth or integrity has no part in the Russian character. We have heard those who know them well say that there are only three honest men in the Empire:—Woronzow is one, Nesselrode another—and men differ about the name of the third. We have heard Statesmen, who strongly incline towards a Muscovite alliance, say that the Russians are liars above all things: it is their *spécialité*. Then the power of the Autocrat, absolute as it is and vigorously as it is exercised, is utterly insufficient to meet the evil. What can a despot do who has no instruments that can be trusted? There is no middle class who pay the taxes and insist upon knowing how they are expended. There is no free Press, with its penetrating and omniscient vigilance, to compel honesty and drag offenders to light and retribution. *There is only one eye over all*: and that eye can of course see only a small corner of this vast Empire. What the Emperor looks at, or can visit, is well done; everything else is neglected or abused. It is the common and inevitable story, wherever you have centralisation and barbarism combined.

Thirdly. The common soldiers, brave and hardy as they are, devoted to their Czar, and careless of privation, have no love of their profession, and no interest in the object of the war. If we except the household regiments, who are near the person of the Emperor, the Russian private has no zeal for glory, no taste for fighting, no pleasure in bold and exciting enterprises. He is a serf, seized by the conscription, and condemned to hopeless slavery for life. He is torn from his family and his land, drilled by his officers, fed on black bread, where fed at all, always without comforts, often without shoes. How can such troops be expected to make head,—we do not say against French enthusiasm, we do not say against British resolution, we do not say against fanatical and hardy mountaineers, like Schamyl and his warriors,—but even against courageous and well-fed Turks, fighting for their country and their faith, and officered by competent commanders? We need not wonder to read that at Ottenitza and Silistria the Russians had to be driven on to the assault with menaces and blows; that general officers had to sacrifice their lives in an unprecedented manner in order to encourage the soldiers to make head against the foe; and that the prisoners of war begged, as a mercy, to be permitted to enlist in the army that had captured them rather than return to misery by being exchanged.

Lastly. There is another source of weakness in the Russian Empire. That vast State is in a great measure composed of the spoils which she has torn from surrounding nations. She is a patchwork of filched and unamalgamated materials. Her frontier provinces are filled with injured, discontented, hostile populations, whom, being unable to reconcile to her rule, she has endeavoured to enfeeble and to crush; and many of whom wait, with more or less of patience and desire, the blessed day of emancipation and revenge. Sweden has never forgiven Russia the seizure of Finland; nor do we hear that the Finns are enamoured of their new connection. On the contrary, our newspapers last week were busy with the squabbles between our Finnish and Russian prisoners of war. The Germans of Livonia are not yet thoroughly amalgamated; and what Poland is and longs to be, we need not say. The ruined Buyards of Bessarabia curse the day which transferred them to the Russian sceptre; and the Danubian Principalities tremble at the prospect of a similar fate. How the Crimea was won and how treated, we described in a recent number (Sept. 2). The Tartars of that province (who still, in spite of every effort, constitute half the population), though languid and inactive, are quite unreconciled, have received our troops with a ready welcome, and would gladly shake off the yoke of their infidel conquerors, and resume their ancestral grandeur under Turkish *suzeraineté*. The Don Cossacks hate Russia with a perfect hatred, for she has violated their privileges and customs, and yearly drains off their youth to be sacrificed in a war which they detest. Since the great Roman Empire, probably no State ever enfolded so many bitter enemies within its embrace, or was girt with such a circle of domestic foes. Three disastrous campaigns, and all this suppressed and smouldering animosity, all likelihood break forth, and leave external enemies nothing to do and little to desire.

Now, these three last sources of Russian weakness are peren-

nial. They belong to her as a despotism, as a centralised administration, as an Empire formed by conquest and unconsolidated and unsecured by conciliation. Until, therefore, her whole system be changed; till an honest middle class has been created; till her Government be liberalised and de-centralised; till a free Press be permitted and encouraged to unveil and denounce abuses; and till the rights and feelings of annexed territories be habitually respected, we do not think that Russia need henceforth be considered as formidable for aggression. She has been unmasked; and it will be the fault of Europe if it dreads her, or submits to be bullied by her, any longer.

OUR GALLANT ARMY IN THE CRIMEA.

We announced last week that information had been received from the Crimea to the 28th, and that the allies had then established the basis of their operations at Balaklava. We also announced that one of Lord Raglan's aide-de-camps was on his way home with despatches. Lord Burghersh reached London on Sunday morning, and the despatch was published in an *Extraordinary Gazette*, issued the same day, giving an account of

THE BATTLE OF THE ALMA.

Our troops, we must remind our readers, landed at Old Fort, near the mouth of the Alma, on the 17th Sept. On the 19th they moved forward, and on the 20th this great battle was fought by the allies attacking the Russians, whose position was stormed, and who were driven at the point of the bayonet into hasty flight. When it is recollected that scarcely one of the British troops had ever been under fire before, and that only a few officers, Lord Raglan and others, had ever seen a battle—that the enemy was placed in a commanding position, strongly fortified—the action does great honour to our skillful and brave officers and men. Before the battle there was no question of our superiority in all the mechanical helps to success, but the personal vigour of our young soldiers, members of a civilised community, in relation to the prowess of the disciplined but rude Russians, was not established. The result of the battle, however, showed that the physical energies of our men, suffering from heat and thirst, and their powers of endurance, were on the same side with the mechanical skill. We give a portion of Lord Raglan's despatch, dated Head-quarters, Katscha River, Sept. 23, 1854, and addressed to the Duke of Newcastle:—

I have the honour to inform your Grace that the allied troops attacked the position occupied by the Russian army behind the Alma on the 20th inst.; and I have great satisfaction in adding that they succeeded, in less than three hours, in driving the enemy from every part of the ground which they had held in the morning, and in establishing themselves upon it.

The English and French armies moved out of their first encampment in the Crimea on the 19th, and bivouacked for the night on the left bank of the Bulganac. Both armies moved towards the Alma the following morning, and it was arranged that Marshal St Arnaud should assail the enemy's left by crossing the river at its junction with the sea, and immediately above it, and that the remainder of the French divisions should move up the heights in their front, whilst the English army should attack the right and centre of the enemy's position.

The position of the Russian army crossed the great road about 2½ miles from the sea, and is very strong by nature. The bold and almost precipitous range of heights, of from 350 to 400 feet, that from the sea closely border the left bank of the river, here ceases, and formed their left, and turning thence round a great amphitheatre, or wide valley, terminates at a salient pinnacle where their right rested, and whence the descent to the plain was more gradual. The front was about two miles in extent. Across the mouth of this great opening is a lower ridge at different heights, varying from 60 to 150 feet, parallel to the river, and at distances from it of from 600 to 800 yards. The river itself is generally fordable for troops, but its banks are extremely rugged, and in most parts steep; the willows along it had been cut down, in order to prevent them from affording cover to the attacking party, and in fact, everything had been done to deprive the assailant of any species of shelter. In front of the position on the right bank, at about 200 yards from the Alma, is the village of Boulouk, and near it a timber bridge, which had been partly destroyed by the enemy. The high pinnacle and ridge before alluded to was the key of the position, and consequently there the greatest preparations had been made for defence. Half way down the height and across its front was a trench of the extent of some hundred yards, to afford cover against an advance up the even steep slope of the hill. On the right, and a little retired, was a powerful covered battery, armed with heavy guns, which flanked the whole of the right of the position. Artillery, at the same time, was posted at the points that best commanded the passage of the river and its approaches generally. On the slopes of these hills (forming a sort of table land) were placed dense masses of the enemy's infantry, whilst on the heights above was his great reserve, the whole amounting, it is supposed, to between 45,000 and 50,000 men.

The combined armies advanced on the same alignment. Her Majesty's troops in continuous double columns, with the front of two divisions covered by light infantry and a troop of horse artillery, the second division, under Lieutenant-General Sir De Lacy Evans, forming the right, and touching the left of the third division of the French army, under his Imperial Highness Prince Napoleon, and the light division, under Lieutenant-General Sir George Brown, the left; the first being supported by the third division, under Lieutenant-General Sir Richard England, and the last by the first division, under Lieutenant-General the Duke of Cambridge. The 4th division, under Lieutenant-General Sir George Cathcart, and the cavalry, under Major-General the Earl of Lucan, were held in reserve to

protect the left flank and rear against large bodies of the enemy's cavalry, which had been seen in those directions.

On approaching to near the fire of the guns, which soon became extremely formidable, the two leading divisions deployed into line, and advanced to attack the front, and the supporting divisions followed the movement. Hardly had this taken place when the village of Boulouk, immediately opposite the centre, was fired by the enemy at all points, creating a continuous blaze for 300 yards, obscuring their position, and rendering a passage through it impracticable. Two regiments of Brigadier-General Adams' brigade, part of Sir De Lacy Evans' division, had in consequence to pass the river at a deep and difficult ford to the right under a sharp fire, whilst his brigade, under Major-General Pennefather, and the remaining regiment of Brigadier-General Adams crossed to the left of the conflagration, opposed by the enemy's artillery from the heights above, and pressed on towards the left of their position with the utmost gallantry and steadiness.

In the meanwhile, the Light division, under Sir George Brown, effected the passage of the Alma in his immediate front. The banks of the river itself were, from their rugged and broken nature, most serious obstacles, and the vineyards, through which the troops had to pass, and the trees which the enemy had felled, created additional impediments, rendering every species of formation, under a galling fire, nearly an impossibility. Lieutenant-General Sir George Brown advanced against the enemy under great disadvantages. In this difficult operation he nevertheless persevered, and the 1st brigade, under Major-General Codrington, succeeded in carrying a redoubt, materially aided by the judicious and steady manner in which Brigadier-General Buller moved on the left flank, and by the advance of four companies of the Rifle brigade, under Major Norcott, who promises to be a distinguished officer of light troops. The heavy fire of grape and musketry, however, to which the troops were exposed, and the losses consequently sustained by the 7th, 23rd, and 33rd regiments, obliged this brigade partially to relinquish its hold. By this time, however, the Duke of Cambridge had succeeded in crossing the river, and had moved up in support, and a brilliant advance of the brigade of Foot Guards, under Major-General Bentinck, drove the enemy back, and secured the final possession of the work. The Highland brigade, under Major-General Sir Colin Campbell, advanced in admirable order and steadiness up the high ground to the left, and in co-operation with the Guards; and Major-General Pennefather's brigade, which had been connected with the right of the Light division, forced the enemy completely to abandon the position they had taken such pains to defend and secure. The 95th regiment, immediately on the right of the Royal Fusiliers in the advance, suffered equally with that corps an immense loss. The aid of the Royal Artillery in all these operations was most effectual. The exertions of the field officers and the captains of troops and batteries to get the guns into action were unceasing, and the precision of their fire materially contributed to the great results of the day. Lieutenant-General Sir Richard England brought his division to the immediate support of the troops in advance, and Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir George Cathcart was actively engaged in watching the left flank.

Lord Raglan then justly records the exertions and merits of his generals and staff officers; and pays to his subalterns and soldiers this compliment:—

I cannot omit to make known to your Grace the cheerfulness with which the regimental officers of the army have submitted to the most unusual privations. My anxiety to bring into the country every cavalry and infantry soldier who was available, prevented me from embarking their baggage animals, and these officers have with them at this moment nothing but what they can carry, and they, equally with the men, are without tents or covering of any kind. I have not heard a single murmur. All seem impressed with the necessity of the arrangement; and they feel, I trust, satisfied that I shall bring up their bat horses at the earliest moment. The conduct of the troops has been admirable. When it is considered that they have suffered severely from sickness during the last two months; that, since they landed in the Crimea, they have been exposed to the extremes of wet, cold, and heat; that the daily toil to provide themselves with water has been excessive, and that they have been pursued by cholera to the very battle-field, I do not go beyond the truth in declaring that they merit the highest commendation. In the ardour of attack they forgot all they had endured, and displayed that high courage, that gallant spirit, for which the British soldier is ever distinguished; and under the heaviest fire they maintained the same determination to conquer as they had exhibited before they went into action.

The navy, too, performed their part well, and Sir Edmund Lyons at its head was most prominent in rendering assistance and in providing for emergencies. The return of the killed and wounded, which includes the names of many gallant officers, amounted to 26 officers, 19 sergeants, 2 drummers, 306 rank and file, 26 horses, killed; 73 officers, 95 sergeants, 17 drummers, 1,427 rank and file, 1 horse, wounded; 2 drummers and 16 rank and file missing. The loss of the Russians was stated at 6,000 men, and the whole army was dispirited; the wounded prisoners, including two general officers, was about 900. Lord Raglan does not pretend to describe the movements of the French, but says "their operations were eminently successful, and that under the guidance of their distinguished commander, Marshal St Arnaud, they manifested the utmost gallantry, the greatest ardour for the attack, and the high military qualities for which they are so famed." The account by Marshal St Arnaud of the battle is equally favourable to the English. "The bravery of Lord Raglan," he says, "rivals that of antiquity. In the midst of cannon and musket shot he displayed a calmness which never left him." Under the Marshal's orders General Bosquet, re-inforced by eight Turkish battalions, turned the left of the Russians, and decided the battle. The French soldiers, par-