Putin's Propaganda Mythology: A Kingdom of Crooked Mirrors
The «Kingdom of Crooked Mirrors» of Putin’s propaganda mythology
The modern Russian political system increasingly clearly demonstrates the signs of a state in which political mythology has become one of the fundamental mechanisms for exercising power. It is not just about propaganda as a means of information influence or a tool of political communication, but about the formation of a holistic alternative reality, within which historical facts, international law, political processes and moral categories are subordinated to the logic of preserving the criminal totalitarian regime and implementing its revisionist geopolitical ambitions.
This is a kind of «kingdom of crooked mirrors», where the truth loses its independent value, and its place is taken by a politically constructed interpretation of reality, designed to legitimize any decisions of the Kremlin, including military aggression, occupation of foreign territories and systematic violation of international law.
The peculiarity of Putin’s propaganda model is that it is not limited to hiding inconvenient facts or spreading outright lies. Its main task is to change the very coordinate system in which society perceives political events.
And its television chauvinist «Kashpirov» Simonyan, Solovyov, Skabeeva, Popov, Sheinin, Kiselyov act not simply as news relays, but as engineers of an alternative reality, whose goal is to deconstruct critical thinking, burn out the remnants of empathy and turn society into an aggressive, but at the same time passive mass.
To do this, a complex of interconnected manipulative mechanisms is used: selective interpretation of history, construction of the image of a permanent external enemy, demonization of Western democracies, denial of the political subjectivity of neighboring states, exploitation of historical traumas and cultivation of a collective sense of a besieged fortress.
As a result, Russian society is offered not an objective picture of international relations, but an ideologically filtered reality, in which Russia is supposedly constantly forced to defend itself from a hostile environment, and its aggressive foreign policy is presented as a historical necessity.
The central place in this mythological construction is occupied by a manipulative reinterpretation of history. The Kremlin’s political discourse systematically uses the historical past not as a subject of scientific research, but as a tool for substantiating modern territorial claims and political ambitions.
Thus, history is transformed into a kind of ideological resource, from which individual events, symbols and figures that do not correspond to the interests of the current government are removed, while contradictory facts, crimes of Soviet totalitarianism, the experience of enslaved peoples and the consequences of Russian imperial expansion are pushed to the periphery of public memory.
Particularly revealing is the desire to present the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. This interpretation loses the fundamental understanding that the independence of the former Soviet republics was not a historical mistake, but the realization of the right of peoples to self-determination and their own state development.
Instead, the post-Soviet space is conceptualized as a zone of special interests of Moscow, where the sovereignty of neighboring states is actually recognized as conditional and dependent on the political will of the Russian leadership.
In this context, one should consider the systematic denial of the full-fledged historical, cultural and political subjectivity of Ukraine. For years, Russian propaganda has tried to consolidate the idea of Ukrainian statehood as an artificial entity, and Ukrainian national identity as a derivative of Russian.
Such distorted rhetoric is not an accidental element of information policy, but a component of an imperial concept that does not allow the existence of an independent Ukrainian political project outside the sphere of Russian influence. After all, an independent Ukraine, which independently determines its own foreign policy course, develops democratic institutions and chooses European integration, destroys the very foundation of Putin’s idea of the post-Soviet space as a territory for the restoration of Russian geopolitical primacy.
This is one of the main reasons for the Kremlin’s special aggressiveness towards Ukraine. Ukrainian independence is not only a geopolitical challenge to Russian ambitions, but also an ideological irritant for this totalitarian system.
The successful functioning of a democratic state, civil society, political pluralism and the ability of citizens to influence the future of their own country demonstrate an alternative model of social development. For a personalist regime that seeks to monopolize political power, such an alternative poses not only an external but also a potential internal threat.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 was the culmination of a multi-year process of forming this ideological system. Military aggression, which by its nature is a gross violation of the UN Charter and the fundamental principles of international law, was presented to Russian society as a forced response to an alleged existential threat.
The Kremlin created a multi-level system of justifications for war, using manipulations of the concepts of security, historical justice, protection of the Russian-speaking population and counteraction to external threats.
At the same time, the fundamental substitution of concepts consists in the fact that they try to shift the responsibility for the outbreak of the war to the state that has become the object of the attack. Ukraine, which defends its territorial integrity and right to exist, is declared a source of danger in the Russian propaganda picture of the world, while the aggressor state appropriates the role of a guarantor of stability and defender of the international order.
This inversion of cause and effect is one of the most characteristic techniques of totalitarian propaganda. It allows you to turn a crime into an allegedly legitimate political action, an attack into self-defense, an occupation into the restoration of historical justice, and violence into the fulfillment of a special civilizational mission.
Obviously, in this way a specific moral system is formed in which the correctness of a political decision is determined not by its compliance with international law or universal human values, but by the extent to which it is consistent with the interests and ideas of the terrorist Moscow regime.
An equally important element of this system is the sacralization of war. Russian state propaganda is increasingly using the historical memory of World War II, the symbolism of the victory over Nazism, and the rhetoric of the fight against evil to legitimize modern aggression.
There is a dangerous transfer of the moral authority of the generation that defeated Nazism to the political decisions of the current Russian leadership. The historical victory is transformed into a kind of ideological indulgence, which supposedly frees modern Russia from the need to adhere to generally accepted legal and moral norms.
At the same time, the fundamental difference between the war against Nazi Germany and the war of aggression against sovereign Ukraine is deliberately silenced. And the use of anti-fascist rhetoric to justify aggression actually discredits the very historical memory of the fight against Nazism, turning it into a tool of political manipulation.
In parallel, the image of the West as an existential enemy of Russia is formed. Then the European Union, the United States of America and NATO appear in the Russian official discourse not as different political and international institutions with their own interests, contradictions and decision-making mechanisms, but as a single hostile center that supposedly seeks to destroy Russian statehood.
This construction has an important domestic political function: it shifts responsibility for socio-economic problems, technological backwardness, corruption, political stagnation, and the deterioration of the population’s well-being from Putin’s government to external opponents. Any criticism of the regime can be interpreted as a manifestation of disloyalty, and the demand for political freedoms as the result of hostile external influence.
And here, Kremlin propaganda serves as a kind of political shield that protects the government from public responsibility. It does not necessarily have to convince every citizen of the reliability of the official version of events. Its effectiveness largely lies in creating an atmosphere of information uncertainty in which a person loses clear criteria for distinguishing truth from falsehood.
When contradictory statements are systematically repeated and alternative sources of information are limited or discredited, society gradually becomes accustomed to the idea that objective truth supposedly does not exist, and all political forces equally manipulate facts. Such information blurring is extremely beneficial for totalitarian governments, as it reduces the population’s ability to critically analyze and collectively respond politically.
At the same time, information monopolization cannot be separated from a system of internal repression. Independent journalists, public activists, human rights defenders, opposition politicians, and representatives of civil society become objects of systematic pressure and can be destroyed or, at best, forced to emigrate.
Legislative restrictions, criminal prosecution for anti-war statements, censorship, blocking of independent media, and expansion of the powers of security forces create an environment in which public denial of the official ideology can have serious personal consequences.
In short, propaganda and repression function as complementary mechanisms: the former shapes the desired picture of the world, the latter ensures the suppression of those who dare to question it.
But, in my opinion, the transformation of Russian state identity is particularly revealing, within which citizenship is increasingly identified with unconditional loyalty to the state and its leaders.
In a democratic political order, the state exists for citizens, and the government is accountable to society. In Putin’s model, this logic is reversed: society is seen as a resource for state power, and citizens as bearers of the duty to support the political course of the leadership. Individual freedom, political independence, and the right to dissent give way to the cult of collective discipline, state greatness, and historical mission.
No less controversial is the economic dimension of this political mythology. The Putin regime is trying to present economic isolation, international sanctions, technological restrictions, and the reduction of economic ties with developed democracies not as a consequence of its own aggressive policy, but as evidence of the hostility of the outside world.
A paradoxical construction emerges: decisions that worsen Russia’s economic prospects are presented as a necessary price for its sovereignty and independence. At the same time, the real economic cost of war, the reorientation of resources to the military-industrial complex, human losses, demographic consequences, and the deepening of technological dependence on a limited circle of partners remain the subject of selective coverage.
However, economic adaptation to sanctions does not mean the absence of long-term structural problems. The displacement of civilian needs by military priorities, increased state intervention in the economy, reduced access to advanced technologies, and increased dependence on raw material exports create the prerequisites for prolonged stagnation.
In such a situation, mythological propaganda attempts to shape public willingness to accept a decline in living standards as an inevitable sacrifice for the sake of abstract historical greatness. In effect, citizens are being offered to exchange the prospects of personal development and economic modernization for a symbolic sense of personal involvement in a great-power project.
At the same time, Putin’s political mythology is part of a broader revisionist project aimed at revising the established international order after the end of the Cold War.
The Kremlin seeks not just to increase its own influence, but to change the very principles of organizing the international environment, replacing the universality of sovereignty and equality of states with a hierarchical model of spheres of influence.
In such a system, large states claim special rights over their neighbors, and the political choices of smaller countries are seen as a matter of agreement between geopolitical centers of power.
For this reason, Russia’s policy toward Ukraine has significance far beyond bilateral relations. It is a test of the international community’s ability to defend the fundamental principle that no state can claim the right to determine the future of another.
It is important to realize that Putin’s mythology is not just a product of the dictator’s personal political beliefs. It has gradually transformed into an institutionalized system for reproducing totalitarian power, in which state ideology, historical politics, power structures, controlled media, educational narratives, and foreign policy rhetoric are intertwined.
Its stability is explained not only by the scale of information influence, but also by the fact that mythology provides the regime with a certain model of social mobilization, justifies the concentration of power, and allows maintaining political loyalty through a constant sense of external danger.
However, any system built on a total distortion of reality has internal contradictions. The greater the gap between the official mythology and the everyday experience of citizens, the more resources are needed to maintain this deceptive propaganda construct.
Military losses, social inequality, corruption, economic hardship, lack of political competition, and uncertainty about the future are gradually shaping a reality that cannot be hidden indefinitely with the help of television images and patriotic rhetoric.
At the same time, one should not equate the presence of these contradictions with the inevitable rapid collapse of the Putin regime. Totalitarian systems can maintain stability for a long time thanks to a repressive apparatus, control over the information space, the distribution of material resources, and the fragmentation of society.
From all this we can conclude: the «kingdom of crooked mirrors» of Putin’s propaganda mythology is not just a system of false messages, but a holistic political technology for constructing an alternative reality, in which aggression is transformed into defense, imperial ambitions into a historical mission, occupation into the restoration of justice, and the suppression of freedom into a guarantee of state stability.
Its strategic goal is to form a society that not only perceives totalitarian power as having no alternative, but gradually assimilates its system of imperial values, distorted political assessments, and perverted historical representations.
For Ukraine, the opposition to this mythology has not only a military, diplomatic, or informational dimension. It is a struggle for the right to independently determine its own history, identity, political system, and future.
For the international community, this issue is much broader than countering Russian disinformation: it is about protecting the very principle of international coexistence, based on the sovereign equality of states, the inviolability of borders, and respect for international law.
History cannot be the private property of a political regime, and geography does not give any state the right to another’s territory. Sovereignty is not a reward for loyalty to a stronger neighbor, and freedom does not become a threat only because it contradicts the interests of a totalitarian government.
These principles constitute a fundamental alternative to imperial political mythology. And the main challenge for the modern democratic world is not to allow the system of crooked mirrors to replace reality to such an extent that aggression begins to be perceived as the norm, the right of the strong as the international order, and the freedom of peoples as a threat to geopolitical stability.
After all, where political myth becomes more important than human life, historical truth, and international law, it is no longer just about mythological propaganda, but about a dangerous transformation of the very nature of the criminal Moscow state and its relations with the outside world.