Putin is losing control: The FSB and the «old KGB» are preparing for the battle for Russia

And leading Western media outlets, such as Radio Liberty, CNN, and the Financial Times, are already openly starting to write about the possibility of a coup in the Russian Federation. Now the question is: Putin's KGB versus the pragmatists from the FSB – who is who?

The current political situation in Russia demonstrates a critical disorganization of traditional centers of power, which affects the internal stability of the state. Where any mistake can trigger uncontrolled decentralization of power.

Recently, there has been a systemic imbalance in the power vertical. When key security institutions, such as the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), represented by structures traditionally associated with the KGB, show signs of irreconcilable opposition.

This competition is taking place against the backdrop of deep socio-economic problems in Russia, the decline in the legitimacy of the Putin regime, and increasing international pressure that imposes restrictions on the government's economic maneuvers and reduces the Kremlin's ability to control the security structures. In an environment where leading Western media openly discuss scenarios of a possible coup, it is important to understand that this is not just a conflict between individual figures.

It is also a structural struggle of interests between two large bureaucratic blocs, each of which seeks to maintain control over political, economic, and information flows. The conflict between the KGB-oriented elites and the FSB has long-term roots and reflects not only a struggle for power within the regime, but also a competition in models of state and resource management.

KGB supporters have traditionally positioned themselves as guarantors of ideological stability, centralization of power, and control over external threats. While the FSB has in recent years focused more on internal control, economic schemes, and personal loyalty to individual members of the Russian leadership.

The parallel existence of these two power networks within the same vertical of Russian power creates systemic contradictions that are ready to escalate into confrontation not only in personnel matters, but also in determining key strategic decisions of the state.

Such a confrontation is intensified by the war in Ukraine, external isolation, economic sanctions, and growing discontent among the population, which potentially opens a window for radical changes in the Russian leadership or even attempts at internal reshuffles of the highest political echelon. However, such processes do not occur instantly and have a number of prerequisites, including a crisis of legitimacy, Putin's loss of complete control over information resources, and the weakening of the regime's economic base.

The problem for the current political leadership of Russia is that any open confrontation between the KGB and FSB clans can destabilize the system no less than external threats, since it paralyzes the state's ability to respond quickly to crisis challenges.

In this sense, even hints by Western media about the possibility of a coup should be seen as a reflection of structural imbalances within the regime, and not as propaganda hyperbole.

The confrontation between Putin's KGB and the FSB is, first and foremost, a struggle for control over the political agenda, resources, and personal loyalty of the security forces. Which in the short term will determine whether the modern Russian state will be able to maintain stability or find itself on the verge of a systemic crisis that will push it to internal transformations.

Currently, the current dynamics of the Russian power vertical are a prime example of how the concentration of power in the hands of the security structures without a proper internal coordination mechanism and in the absence of safeguards leads to structural tension.

The absence of mechanisms of checks and balances creates structural tension that threatens to develop into a deep political crisis. After all, when the special services are endowed with the functions of political supervision, they begin to fabricate threats to confirm their own significance, which deprives the system of an adequate perception of reality.

In conditions where international isolation and internal economic problems intensify competition between the KGB-oriented and FSB-oriented factions of the power bloc, the question of «who is who» becomes not rhetorical, but critical for understanding the prospects for the stability of the Putin regime and possible scenarios for the development of events in the Russian Federation.

This struggle between the old-school Chekists and the new generation of the FSB-cracy is a logical consequence of the critical narrowing of the resource base within the Russian Federation.

If Putin's balancing system previously allowed different groups of influence to coexist peacefully, «feeding» on different sectors of the economy, today's liquidity shortage and technological decline are turning former intra-elite agreements into a zero-sum game.

The KGB-oriented faction, associated with ideological conservatism, geopolitical revanchism, and control over strategic sectors such as the military-industrial complex (MIC) and energy resources, is increasingly entering into a clinching clash with the technocratic and operational wing of the FSB.

The latter, with a monopoly on domestic terror and control over shadow financial flows, seeks a complete redistribution of assets previously owned by the «old» KGB clans. This competition goes beyond the struggle for positions – it is a battle for strategic survival in the post-Putin perspective.

The key factor of destabilization here is the effect of the «besieged fortress». When external markets are closed for Russia, the only source of enrichment becomes the redistribution of existing property and finances within the country.

The FSB, using the tools of criminal cases and accusations of treason or corruption, begins a systematic attack on the positions of the KGB elite, which has settled in state corporations.

In response, KGB-oriented structures are trying to appeal to the «supreme arbitrator» of Putin, emphasizing the risks of losing control of the state due to the excessive strengthening of the special services, which has actually created a «state within a state».

For the regime, this conflict poses an existential threat.

First, the monolithic nature of the power fist is destroyed, which makes the system vulnerable to sudden internal shocks or management errors.

Secondly, the fierce struggle for resources demotivates the middle level of the bureaucracy, which instead of performing state functions is forced to choose sides in an inter-clan war in order not to become another victim of «cleansing the ranks».

Ultimately, the «who is who» scenario can end either with a complete victory of one of the groups, which will lead to the establishment of an even tougher personalist dictatorship without any restraints, or it will provoke paralysis of the government.

In the context of increasing international pressure on the Russian Federation and internal economic imbalances, it is this internal split in the special services that can become the mechanism that will trigger a cascading collapse of the Putin system, where loyalty to the leader, who is already starting to lose power, will give way to the instinct of self-preservation of a particular clan.

It seems that this scenario is starting to look more and more realistic, since the architecture of modern Russian power is based not on a monolithic ideology, but on a delicate balance between «power corporations», where the role of the supreme arbiter was a key function of the ruler.

When the external sanctions and the degradation of the Russian economy begin to wash away the resource base for which these groups compete, the traditional confrontation between the conventional «technocrats-pragmatists» and «hawks» from the special services is transformed into an intraspecific war for survival.

In such a system, loyalty is a commodity that is exchanged for security and rent. And as soon as the leader ceases to guarantee the protection of assets from internal raiding or external persecution, the erosion of the vertical becomes irreversible.

An internal split within the special services may be provoked by the realization that the current course leads to the final transformation of Russia into an isolated raw material province with no chance of a global future. And this directly contradicts the interests of young generals and mid-level managers who seek to convert their influence into legitimate capital.

But for now, instead of removing Putin by force, we will most likely see the «knockout» of key figures in the dictator's entourage and his opponents from the FSB, the «quiet sabotage» of Kremlin decisions, or a series of controlled leaks of information that will discredit competitors in the struggle for access to scarce resources.

This will create a situation where each clan will begin to look for channels for separate negotiations with the West or regional powers, trying to exchange the security of their assets and a guarantee of inviolability for Putin's betrayal.

And it can be assumed that the cascading collapse of the system will begin precisely when the fear of destabilization after Putin's departure from power becomes less than the fear of dying with him in the military-economic adventure that the protracted bloody war in Ukraine has become.

As soon as the security forces realize that Putin's regime has turned into a loss-making and toxic asset, the instinct of self-preservation will launch the process of internal self-destruction of the system.

At this moment, Putin's The state apparatus, which previously functioned as a single mechanism of suppression, will disintegrate into local centers of power. Each of them will try to establish its own control over the remnants of administrative resources, which will inevitably lead to the paralysis of the executive branch and the collapse of the myth of «stability» on which the legitimacy of the Putin regime has been built for decades.

The disintegration of Putin's state apparatus and its transformation into a conglomerate of autonomous local centers of power will mark the rapid transition of the political system from monocentric totalitarianism to a state of fragmented feudalism.

In the conditions of the degradation of the power vertical, competition for the remnants of administrative and power resources will inevitably take on a conflictual character, where legitimacy will be determined not by formal law, but by the ability to maintain physical control over territory and assets.

At this point, the paralysis of the executive vertical in the Russian Federation will become a systemic consequence of the internal erosion of state institutions, which for years were built not on the basis of functional efficiency, but on personal loyalty. What Putin's absence as an arbitrator will turn them into hostile antagonistic groups.

And when the myth of «stability» finally disappears, Putin's regime will not just suffer an ideological fiasco – the very foundation of contractual relations between the authorities and society will be shaken, which will result in the collapse of the system and the complete loss of controllability of the state.

After that, there will be a transition from controlled totalitarianism to a state of disintegration of a single institutional structure into separate elements. The collapse of «stability» will turn off the mechanisms of loyalty, turning the state apparatus into a set of isolated links incapable of solidary action.

Then the loss of controllability becomes irreversible, since a political system devoid of an ideological foundation and the ability to guarantee security has no alternative model of legitimation.

Putin's regime has entered a stage of institutional uncertainty. The transformation of a monolith into a fragile structure indicates the exhaustion of the resources of political survival. Under such conditions, the collapse of the system becomes an inevitable consequence of its internal degradation, and the specific date of the finale is only a variable in the equation of general systemic failure.